Strong Determinism
arXiv:2203.02886 · doi:10.3998/phimp.3250
Abstract
A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), ''it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.'' Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in a world like ours. In this paper, I show that it can be achieved in a simple way and discuss its implications for metaphysics and philosophy of science, including natural properties, free will, explanation, and modality. First, I propose a precise definition of strong determinism. Next, I discuss its philosophical ramifications and a toy example. Finally, I provide a realistic example of a strongly deterministic (and simple) physical theory -- the Everettian Wentaculus. A surprising consequence is that whether or not our world is strongly deterministic may be empirically underdetermined.
arXiv commentAccepted version, Philosophers' Imprint
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