Learning Classical Readout Quantum PUFs based on single-qubit gates
arXiv:2112.06661 · doi:10.1007/s42484-022-00073-1
Abstract
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a way to identify and authenticate electronic devices. Recently, several ideas have been presented that aim to achieve the same for quantum devices. Some of these constructions apply single-qubit gates in order to provide a secure fingerprint of the quantum device. In this work, we formalize the class of Classical Readout Quantum PUFs (CR-QPUFs) using the statistical query (SQ) model and explicitly show insufficient security for CR-QPUFs based on single qubit rotation gates, when the adversary has SQ access to the CR-QPUF. We demonstrate how a malicious party can learn the CR-QPUF characteristics and forge the signature of a quantum device through a modelling attack using a simple regression of low-degree polynomials. The proposed modelling attack was successfully implemented in a real-world scenario on real IBM Q quantum machines. We thoroughly discuss the prospects and problems of CR-QPUFs where quantum device imperfections are used as a secure fingerprint.
arXiv comment12 pages, 9 figures
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