Collapse of the many-worlds interpretation: Why Everett's theory is typically wrong
arXiv:2109.10646
Abstract
We analyze the objective meaning of probabilities in the context of the many-worlds interpretation of Everett. For this purpose we study in details the weak law of large numbers and the role of typicality and universally negligible probabilities (through the works of Cournot and Borel). We demonstrate that Everett's theory doesn't provide any clue for fixing a probability rule and therefore contradicts irrevocably empirical facts and Born's law.
arXiv commentSubmitted work
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