Game-Theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents (extended abstract)
arXiv:2106.11503 · doi:10.4204/EPTCS.335.19
Abstract
We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and problematic extension to general normal form games. We give such a generalization based on concept of program equilibria, and point out that that a practically relevant generalization may not exist. To remedy this we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria that are special cases Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.
In Proceedings TARK 2021, arXiv:2106.10886. This is the extended abstract that appears in the Proceedings of TARK 2021. A longer, more complete, version of the paper is available as preprint arXiv:2012.09759