Scale-free networks may not necessarily witness cooperation
arXiv:2101.01167 · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/134/60002
Abstract
Networks with a scale-free degree distribution are widely thought to promote cooperation in various games. Herein, by studying the well-known prisoner's dilemma game, we demonstrate that this need not necessarily be true. For the very same degree sequence and degree distribution, we present a variety of possible behaviour. We reassess the perceived importance of hubs in a network towards the maintenance of cooperation. We also reevaluate the dependence of cooperation on network clustering and assortativity.
arXiv commentAccepted to Europhysics Letters (EPL)
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