Design and Stability Analysis of a Shared Mobility Market

Abstract

In recent years, we have witnessed a remarkable surge of usage in shared vehicles in our cities. Shared mobility offers a future of no congestion in busy city roads with increasing populations of travelers, passengers, and drivers. Given the behavioral decision-making of travelers and the shared vehicles' operators, however, the question is "how can we ensure a socially-acceptable assignment between travelers and vehicles?" In other words, how can we design a shared mobility system that assigns each traveler to the "right" vehicle? In this paper, we design a shared mobility market consisted of travelers and vehicles in a transportation network. We formulate a linear programming problem and derive the optimal assignment between travelers and vehicles. In addition, we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the stable traveler-vehicle profit allocation. Our goal is twofold: maximize the social welfare of all travelers with the optimal assignment while ensuring the feasibility and stability of the traveler-vehicle profit allocation while respecting the decision-making of both the travelers and the vehicles' operators.

References in corpus (5)

• Dynamic vehicle redistribution and online price incentives in shared mobility systems
• Optimal Time Trajectory and Coordination for Connected and Automated Vehicles
• Enhanced Mobility With Connectivity and Automation: A Review of Shared Autonomous Vehicle Systems
• Route-cost-assignment with joint user and operator behavior as a many-to-one stable matching assignment game
• A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Social Impact of Connected and Automated Vehicles