Are quantum cryptographic security claims vacuous?
arXiv:2010.11961
Abstract
A central claim in quantum cryptography is that secrecy can be proved rigorously, based on the assumption that the relevant information-processing systems obey the laws of quantum physics. This claim has recently been challenged by Bernstein (arXiv:1803.04520). He argues that the laws of physics may also entail an unavoidable leakage of any classical information encoded in physical carriers. The security claim of quantum key distribution would then be vacuous, as the computation of the final secret key would leak its value. However, as we explain in this short note, Bernstein's reasoning is based on a too "classical" understanding of physics. It follows from known theorems about fault-tolerant quantum computation that quantum physics avoids his conclusion.
arXiv comment7 pages
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