Evolutionary dynamics in financial markets with heterogeneities in strategies and risk tolerance

Abstract

In nature and human societies, the effects of homogeneous and heterogeneous characteristics on the evolution of collective behaviors are quite different from each other. It is of great importance to understand the underlying mechanisms of the occurrence of such differences. By incorporating pair pattern strategies and reference point strategies into an agent-based model, we have investigated the coupled effects of heterogeneous investment strategies and heterogeneous risk tolerance on price fluctuations. In the market flooded with the investors with homogeneous investment strategies or homogeneous risk tolerance, large price fluctuations are easy to occur. In the market flooded with the investors with heterogeneous investment strategies or heterogeneous risk tolerance, the price fluctuations are suppressed. For a heterogeneous population, the coexistence of investors with pair pattern strategies and reference point strategies causes the price to have a slow fluctuation around a typical equilibrium point and both a large price fluctuation and a no-trading state are avoided, in which the pair pattern strategies push the system far away from the equilibrium while the reference point strategies pull the system back to the equilibrium. A theoretical analysis indicates that the evolutionary dynamics in the present model is governed by the competition between different strategies. The strategy that causes large price fluctuations loses more while the strategy that pulls the system back to the equilibrium gains more. Overfrequent trading does harm to one's pursuit for more wealth.

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