Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions
arXiv:2010.04175 · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ac304b
Abstract
In device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), an adversary prepares a device consisting of two components, distributed to Alice and Bob, who use the device to generate a secure key. The security of existing DIQKD schemes holds under the assumption that the two components of the device cannot communicate with one another during the protocol execution. This is called the no-communication assumption in DIQKD. Here, we show how to replace this assumption, which can be hard to enforce in practice, by a standard computational assumption from post-quantum cryptography: we give a protocol that produces secure keys even when the components of an adversarial device can exchange arbitrary quantum communication, assuming the device is computationally bounded. Importantly, the computational assumption only needs to hold during the protocol execution -- the keys generated at the end of the protocol are information-theoretically secure as in standard DIQKD protocols.
14 pages, 2 figures; v2 is close to journal version; v3 updates only funding information, not content
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