On Controllability of AI
arXiv:2008.04071
Abstract
Invention of artificial general intelligence is predicted to cause a shift in the trajectory of human civilization. In order to reap the benefits and avoid pitfalls of such powerful technology it is important to be able to control it. However, possibility of controlling artificial general intelligence and its more advanced version, superintelligence, has not been formally established. In this paper, we present arguments as well as supporting evidence from multiple domains indicating that advanced AI can't be fully controlled. Consequences of uncontrollability of AI are discussed with respect to future of humanity and research on AI, and AI safety and security.
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