Optimal Learning Dynamics of Multi Agents in Restless Multiarmed Bandit Game

Abstract

Social learning is learning through the observation of or interaction with other individuals; it is critical in the understanding of the collective behaviors of humans in social physics. We study the learning process of agents in a restless multiarmed bandit (rMAB). The binary payoff of each arm changes randomly and agents maximize their payoffs by exploiting an arm with payoff 1, searching the arm at random (individual learning), or copying an arm exploited by other agents (social learning). The system has Pareto and Nash equilibria in the mixed strategy space of social and individual learning. We study several models in which agents maximize their expected payoffs in the strategy space, and demonstrate analytically and numerically that the system converges to the equilibria. We also conducted an experiment and investigated whether human participants adopt the optimal strategy. In this experiment, three participants play the game. If the reward of each group is proportional to the sum of the payoffs, the median of the social learning rate almost coincides with that of the Pareto equilibrium.

arXiv comment16 pages, 9 figures

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