Social Resource Allocation in a Mobility System with Connected and Automated Vehicles: A Mechanism Design Problem

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the social resource allocation in an emerging mobility system consisting of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) using mechanism design. CAVs provide the most intriguing opportunity for enabling travelers to monitor mobility system conditions efficiently and make better decisions. However, this new reality will influence travelers' tendency-of-travel and might give rise to rebound effects, e.g., increased-vehicle-miles traveled. To tackle this phenomenon, we propose a mechanism design formulation that provides an efficient social resource allocation of travel time for all travelers. Our focus is on the socio-technical aspect of the problem, i.e., by designing appropriate socio-economic incentives, we seek to prevent potential rebound effects. In particular, we propose an economically inspired mechanism to influence the impact of the travelers' decision-making on the well-being of an emerging mobility system.

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