Game Theory for Cyber Deception: A Tutorial
arXiv:1903.01442
Abstract
Deceptive and anti-deceptive technologies have been developed for various specific applications. But there is a significant need for a general, holistic, and quantitative framework of deception. Game theory provides an ideal set of tools to develop such a framework of deception. In particular, game theory captures the strategic and self-interested nature of attackers and defenders in cybersecurity. Additionally, control theory can be used to quantify the physical impact of attack and defense strategies. In this tutorial, we present an overview of game-theoretic models and design mechanisms for deception and counter-deception. The tutorial aims to provide a taxonomy of deception and counter-deception and understand how they can be conceptualized, quantified, and designed or mitigated. This tutorial gives an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic underpinning of cyberdeception. The tutorial will also discuss open problems and research challenges that the HoTSoS community can address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory.
arXiv commentarXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1808.08066
References in corpus (4)
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- Deception by Design: Evidence-Based Signaling Games for Network Defense
- A Game-Theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy
- Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Evidence-Based Strategies and Dynamic Risk Mitigation