Fundraising and vote distribution: a non-equilibrium statistical approach

Abstract

The number of votes correlates strongly with the money spent in a campaign, but the relation between the two is not straightforward. Among other factors, the output of a ballot depends on the number of candidates, voters, and available resources. Here, we develop a conceptual framework based on Shannon entropy maximization and Superstatistics to establish a relation between the distributions of money spent by candidates and their votes. By establishing such a relation, we provide a tool to predict the outcome of a ballot and to alert for possible misconduct either in the report of fundraising and spending of campaigns or on vote counting. As an example, we consider real data from a proportional election with $6323$ candidates, where a detailed data verification is virtually impossible, and show that the number of potential misconducting candidates to audit can be reduced to only nine.

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