Fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores
arXiv:1807.10684
Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are `chores' that yield negative utility for the agents. In this paper, we consider a more general scenario where an agent may have negative or positive utility for each item. This framework captures, e.g., fair task assignment, where agents can have both positive and negative utilities for each task. We show that whereas some of the positive axiomatic and computational results extend to this more general setting, others do not. We present several new and efficient algorithms for finding fair allocations in this general setting. We also point out several gaps in the literature regarding the existence of allocations satisfying certain fairness and efficiency properties and further study the complexity of computing such allocations.
This article is a complete version of a conference paper, which appeared in IJCAI 2019. The conference version contains an error in the proof of Theorem 2 regarding EF1 existence for arbitrary utility functions
References in corpus (1)
Cited by in corpus (11)
- Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles
- Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores
- Envy-free Relaxations for Goods, Chores, and Mixed Items
- The Fairness of Leximin in Allocation of Indivisible Chores
- Greedy Algorithms for Fair Division of Mixed Manna
- Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods
- Weighted Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Indivisible Chores
- Almost Envy Freeness and Welfare Efficiency in Fair Division with Goods or Bads
- Strategyproof and Approximately Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Chores
- Guarantees in Fair Division: general or monotone preferences