Unobservable False Data Injection Attacks against PMUs: Feasible Conditions and Multiplicative Attacks
arXiv:1806.05057
Abstract
This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible conditions under which FDI attacks are unobservable to this enhanced BDD are discussed. In addition, a class of multiplicative FDI attacks that maintain the rank of the PMU measurement matrix is introduced. Simulation results on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system indicate that the these multiplicative unobservable attacks can avoid detection by both the enhanced BDD and a detector based on low-rank decomposition proposed in prior work.
6 pages, 6 figures
References in corpus (3)
- Vulnerability Analysis and Consequences of False Data Injection Attack on Power System State Estimation
- Identification of Successive "Unobservable" Cyber Data Attacks in Power Systems Through Matrix Decomposition
- Evaluating Power System Vulnerability to False Data Injection Attacks via Scalable Optimization