Emergence of Cooperation in the thermodynamic limit
arXiv:1803.10083 · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2020.109762
Abstract
Predicting how cooperative behavior arises in the thermodynamic limit is one of the outstanding problems in evolutionary game theory. For two player games, cooperation is seldom the Nash equilibrium. However, in the thermodynamic limit cooperation is the natural recourse regardless of whether we are dealing with humans or animals. In this work, we use the analogy with the Ising model to predict how cooperation arises in the thermodynamic limit.
arXiv comment21 pages, 4 figures, Accepted for publication in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (2020)
References in corpus (7)
- Opinion evolution in closed community
- Evolutionary potential games on lattices
- Ising model versus normal form game
- Thermodynamics of Evolutionary Games
- Triggers for cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit: a case study in Public goods game
- Quantum Nash equilibrium in the thermodynamic limit
- Entanglement renders free riding redundant in the thermodynamic limit
Cited by in corpus (8)
- Triggers for cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit: a case study in Public goods game
- Thermodynamic susceptibility as a measure of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas
- Quantum Nash equilibrium in the thermodynamic limit
- Nash equilibrium mapping vs Hamiltonian dynamics vs Darwinian evolution for some social dilemma games in the thermodynamic limit
- Switching global correlations on and off in a many-body quantum state by tuning local entanglement
- Agent-based Modelling of Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
- Vaccination Dilemma in the thermodynamic limit
- Game susceptibility, Correlation and Payoff capacity as a measure of Cooperative behavior in the thermodynamic limit of some Social dilemmas