Mean field model of a game for power
arXiv:1802.02860 · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.03.110
Abstract
Our aim is to model a game for power as a dynamical process, where an excess of power possessed by a player allows him to gain even more power. Such a positive feedback is often termed as the Matthew effect. Analytical and numerical methods allow to identify a set of fixed points of the model dynamics. The positions of the unstable fixed points give an insight on the basins of attraction of the stable fixed points. The results are interpreted in terms of modeling of coercive power.
16 pages, 6 figures
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