Equilibria in the Tangle

Abstract

We analyse the Tangle --- a DAG-valued stochastic process where new vertices get attached to the graph at Poissonian times, and the attachment's locations are chosen by means of random walks on that graph. These new vertices, also thought of as "transactions", are issued by many players (which are the nodes of the network), independently. The main application of this model is that it is used as a base for the IOTA cryptocurrency system (www.iota.org). We prove existence of "almost symmetric" Nash equilibria for the system where a part of players tries to optimize their attachment strategies. Then, we also present simulations that show that the "selfish" players will nevertheless cooperate with the network by choosing attachment strategies that are similar to the "recommended" one.

33 pages, 11 figures

References in corpus (1)

• The covertime of a biased random walk on $G_{n,p}$

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