Quantum routing games
arXiv:1709.10500 · doi:10.1088/1751-8121/aae31f
Abstract
We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition of a zero cost edge decreases the efficiency of the network. A quantization scheme applicable to non-atomic routing games is applied to the canonical example of the network used in Braess' Paradox. The quantum players are modeled by simulating repeated game play. The players are allowed to sample their local payoff function and update their strategies based on a selfish routing condition in order to minimize their own cost, leading to the Wardrop equilibrium flow. The equilibrium flow in the classical network has a higher cost than the optimal flow. If the players have access to quantum resources, we find that the cost at equilibrium can be reduced to the optimal cost, resolving the paradox.
arXiv comment5 pages, 3 figures
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