A philosophical argument against time machines

Abstract

Time machines are predictions of Einstein's theory of general relativity and provide a myriad of unsolved paradoxes. Convincing and general arguments against time machines and their paradoxes are missing in physics and philosophy so far. In this article, a philosophical argument against time machines is given. When thought of as a process, individuation refuses the idea of time machines, in particular travels into the past. With the aid of Nietzsche-Heraclitus' philosophy of becoming and Simondon's notion of process of individuation, I propose that time machines are modern fables, created by the man of $\text{ressentiment}$. In the $\text{amor fati}$ formula of Nietzsche, I suggest the antipode to time machines.

14 pages. Version with improvements, corrections, new references and section. Published in The Agonist

References in corpus (3)

• Closed timelike curves and causality violation
• Stability, causality and quasinormal modes of cosmic strings and cylinders
• Bouncing Cosmologies