Microscopic modeling and analysis of collective decision making: equality bias leads suboptimal solutions
arXiv:1703.09098 · doi:10.1007/s11565-017-0280-4
Abstract
We discuss a novel microscopic model for collective decision-making interacting multi-agent systems. In particular we are interested in modeling a well known phenomena in the experimental literature called equality bias, where agents tend to behave in the same way as if they were as good, or as bad, as their partner. We analyze the introduced problem and we prove the suboptimality of the collective decision-making in the presence of equality bias. Numerical experiments are addressed in the last section.
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