GNSS Signal Authentication via Power and Distortion Monitoring

Abstract

We propose a simple low-cost technique that enables civil Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers and other civil global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers to reliably detect carry-off spoofing and jamming. The technique, which we call the Power-Distortion detector, classifies received signals as interference-free, multipath-afflicted, spoofed, or jammed according to observations of received power and correlation function distortion. It does not depend on external hardware or a network connection and can be readily implemented on many receivers via a firmware update. Crucially, the detector can with high probability distinguish low-power spoofing from ordinary multipath. In testing against over 25 high-quality empirical data sets yielding over 900,000 separate detection tests, the detector correctly alarms on all malicious spoofing or jamming attacks while maintaining a <0.6% single-channel false alarm rate.

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• Rejection of Smooth GPS Time Synchronization Attacks via Sparse Techniques
• GNSS jammer localization and identification with airborne commercial GNSS receivers
• Improving Galileo OSNMA Time To First Authenticated Fix
• Time-based GNSS attack detection