The Final Theory of Physics - a Tautology?
arXiv:1702.00301
Abstract
We acuminate the idea of a final theory of physics in order to analyze its logical implications and consequences. It is argued that the rationale of a final theory is the principle of sufficient reason. This implies that a final theory of physics, presumed such a theory is possible, does not allow to incorporate substantial (non-trivial) propositions unless they are logically or mathematically deduced. Differences between physics and mathematics are discussed with emphasis on the role of physical constants. It is shown that it is logically impossible to introduce constants on the fundamental level of a final theory. The most fundamental constants emerging within a final theory are constants of motion. It is argued that the only possibility to formulate a final theory is necessarily a tautology: A final theory of physics can only be derived from those presumptions about reality that are inherent in the idea and practice of physics itself. It is argued that a final theory is based on the notion of objectivity, but it is logically impossible that an ideal final theory supports realism.
arXiv commentVarious minor corrections applied
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