Unconditionally secure credit/debit card chip scheme and physical unclonable function

Abstract

The statistical-physics-based Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange offers a new and simple unclonable system for credit/debit card chip authentication and payment. The key exchange, the authentication and the communication are unconditionally secure so that neither mathematics- nor statistics-based attacks are able to crack the scheme. The ohmic connection and the short wiring lengths between the chips in the card and the terminal constitute an ideal setting for the KLJN protocol, and even its simplest versions offer unprecedented security and privacy for credit/debit card chips and applications of physical unclonable functions.

This version is accepted for publication in Fluctuation and Noise Letters

References in corpus (4)

• On the security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) communicator
• Generalized Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system using arbitrary resistors
• Physical uncloneable function hardware keys utilizing Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange and noise-based logic
• Random-resistor-random-temperature Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (RRRT-KLJN) key exchange

Cited by in corpus (1)

• Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme