Quantum cloning attacks against PUF-based quantum authentication systems
arXiv:1605.00786 · doi:10.1007/s11128-016-1316-x
Abstract
With the advent of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), PUF-based quantum authentication systems (QAS) have been proposed for security purposes and recently proof-of-principle experiment has been demonstrated. As a further step towards completing the security analysis, we investigate quantum cloning attacks against PUF-based quantum authentication systems and prove that quantum cloning attacks outperform the so-called challenge-estimation attacks. We present the analytical expression of the false accept probability by use of the corresponding optimal quantum cloning machines and extend the previous results in the literature. In light of these findings, an explicit comparison is made between PUF-based quantum authentication systems and quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols in the context of cloning attacks. Moreover, from an experimental perspective, a trade-off between the average photon number and the detection efficiency is discussed in detail.
15 pages, 4 figures
References in corpus (4)
Cited by in corpus (8)
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