Arbitrarily long relativistic bit commitment

Abstract

We consider the recent relativistic bit commitment protocol introduced by Lunghi et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 2015] and present a new security analysis against classical attacks. In particular, while the initial complexity of the protocol scaled double-exponentially with the commitment time, our analysis shows that the correct dependence is only linear. This has dramatic implications in terms of implementation: in particular, the commitment time can easily be made arbitrarily long, by only requiring both parties to communicate classically and perform efficient classical computation.

In an independent and concurrent work, Fehr and Fillinger [FF15] proved a general composition theorem for two-prover commitments which implies a similar bound on the security of the Lunghi et al. protocol than the one derived here

References in corpus (1)

• Cryptography from Noisy Storage

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