Synchronization and extinction in cyclic games with mixed strategies
arXiv:1503.00058 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.91.052135
Abstract
We consider cyclic Lotka-Volterra models with three and four strategies where at every interaction agents play a strategy using a time-dependent probability distribution. Agents learn from a loss by reducing the probability to play a losing strategy at the next interaction. For that, an agent is described as an urn containing balls of three respectively four types where after a loss one of the balls corresponding to the losing strategy is replaced by a ball representing the winning strategy. Using both mean-field rate equations and numerical simulations, we investigate a range of quantities that allow us to characterize the properties of these cyclic models with time-dependent probability distributions. For the three-strategy case in a spatial setting we observe a transition from neutrally stable to stable when changing the level of discretization of the probability distribution. For large values of , yielding a good approximation to a continuous distribution, spatially synchronized temporal oscillations dominate the system. For the four-strategy game the system is always neutrally stable, but different regimes emerge, depending on the size of the system and the level of discretization.
26 pages, 8 figures, version accepted for publication in the Physical Review E
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