Crawford-Sobel meet Lloyd-Max on the grid
arXiv:1410.6831 · doi:10.1109/ICASSP.2014.6854781
Abstract
The main contribution of this work is twofold. First, we apply, for the first time, a framework borrowed from economics to a problem in the smart grid namely, the design of signaling schemes between a consumer and an electricity aggregator when these have non-aligned objectives. The consumer's objective is to meet its need in terms of power and send a request (a message) to the aggregator which does not correspond, in general, to its actual need. The aggregator, which receives this request, not only wants to satisfy it but also wants to manage the cost induced by the residential electricity distribution network. Second, we establish connections between the exploited framework and the quantization problem. Although the model assumed for the payoff functions for the consumer and aggregator is quite simple, it allows one to extract insights of practical interest from the analysis conducted. This allows us to establish a direct connection with quantization, and more importantly, to open a much more general challenge for source and channel coding.
ICASSP 2014, 5 pages
References in corpus (1)
Cited by in corpus (6)
- Dynamic Signaling Games with Quadratic Criteria under Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria
- On the Number of Bins in Equilibria for Signaling Games
- Game Theory for Signal Processing in Networks
- Quadratic Signaling Games with Channel Combining Ratio
- Signaling Games for Log-Concave Distributions: Number of Bins and Properties of Equilibria
- Interference Coordination via Power Domain Channel Estimation