Why I am not a QBist

Abstract

Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, is a recent development of the epistemic view of quantum states, according to which the state vector represents knowledge about a quantum system, rather than the true state of the system. QBism explicitly adopts the subjective view of probability, wherein probability assignments express an agent's personal degrees of belief about an event. QBists claim that most if not all conceptual problems of quantum mechanics vanish if we simply take a proper epistemic and probabilistic perspective. Although this judgement is largely subjective and logically consistent, I explain why I do not share it.

Added remarks and clarifications; forthcoming in Foundations of Physics

References in corpus (5)

• An Introduction to QBism with an Application to the Locality of Quantum Mechanics
• QBism, the Perimeter of Quantum Bayesianism
• The whole is greater than the sum of the parts: on the possibility of purely statistical interpretations of quantum theory
• QBism as CBism: Solving the Problem of "the Now"
• QBism: A Critical Appraisal

Cited by in corpus (7)

• Can we close the Bohr-Einstein quantum debate?
• EPR Paradox, Quantum Nonlocality and Physical Reality
• Multiplicity in Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics
• QBism, FAPP and the Quantum Omelette. (Or, Unscrambling Ontological Problems from Epistemological Solutions in QM)
• Reflections on Zeilinger-Brukner information interpretation of quantum mechanics
• Is Quantum Mechanics Self-Interpreting?
• On Quantum Bayesianism