Complexity of Judgment Aggregation

Abstract

We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of individual judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding whether a given agent can influence the outcome of a judgment aggregation procedure in her favour by reporting insincere judgments (the strategic manipulation problem); and (3) deciding whether a given judgment aggregation scenario is guaranteed to result in a logically consistent outcome, independently from what the judgments supplied by the individuals are (the problem of the safety of the agenda). We provide results both for specific aggregation procedures (the quota rules, the premise-based procedure, and a distance-based procedure) and for classes of aggregation procedures characterised in terms of fundamental axioms.

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