Discussion: Foundations of Statistical Inference, Revisited
arXiv:1312.7183 · doi:10.1214/14-STS472
Abstract
This is an invited contribution to the discussion on Professor Deborah Mayo's paper, "On the Birnbaum argument for the strong likelihood principle," to appear in Statistical Science. Mayo clearly demonstrates that statistical methods violating the likelihood principle need not violate either the sufficiency or conditionality principle, thus refuting Birnbaum's claim. With the constraints of Birnbaum's theorem lifted, we revisit the foundations of statistical inference, focusing on some new foundational principles, the inferential model framework, and connections with sufficiency and conditioning. [arXiv:1302.7021]
arXiv commentPublished in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/14-STS472 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org)
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- On an inferential model construction using generalized associations
- A note on p-values interpreted as plausibilities
- Frameworks for prior-free posterior probabilistic inference
- Conditional fiducial models
- Valid uncertainty quantification about the model in a linear regression setting