Distributed Detection in Tree Topologies with Byzantines

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of distributed detection in tree topologies in the presence of Byzantines. The expression for minimum attacking power required by the Byzantines to blind the fusion center (FC) is obtained. More specifically, we show that when more than a certain fraction of individual node decisions are falsified, the decision fusion scheme becomes completely incapable. We obtain closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies that minimize the detection error exponent at the FC. We also look at the possible counter-measures from the FC's perspective to protect the network from these Byzantines. We formulate the robust topology design problem as a bi-level program and provide an efficient algorithm to solve it. We also provide some numerical results to gain insights into the solution.

References in corpus (1)

• Fastest Distributed Consensus Averaging Problem on Perfect and Complete n-ary Tree networks

Cited by in corpus (6)

• Distributed Bayesian Detection with Byzantine Data
• Consensus based Detection in the Presence of Data Falsification Attacks
• Asymptotic Analysis of Distributed Bayesian Detection with Byzantine Data
• Low-complexity Distributed Detection with One-bit Memory Under Neyman-Pearson Criterion
• Distributed Inference in Tree Networks using Coding Theory
• Distributed Detection in Tree Networks: Byzantines and Mitigation Techniques