Timing attacks on practical quantum cryptographic systems
arXiv:1206.7019
Abstract
With photons being the only available candidates for long-distance quantum communication, most quantum cryptographic devices are physically realized as optical systems that operate a security protocol based on the laws of quantum mechanics. But to finally yield a stream of bits (secret key) usable for encryption, a quantum-to-classical transition is required. Synchronization of electronic & optoelectronic components involved in such tasks thus becomes a necessary and important step. However, it also opens up the possibility of timing-based loopholes and attacks.
Original article published in Hakin9 Extra, a digital IT Security magazine (hakin9.org). Section 2 serves to explain (in essence) the operation of a quantum-crypto protocol to even non-scientists. Comments welcome
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