Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a population of cooperating agents
arXiv:1201.4955 · doi:10.3390/g3010030
Abstract
In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably little to any of their cooperations. Here, we investigate a variant of the model, in which highly-connected agents have access to additional resources. We study analytically and numerically whether these resources are invested in existing collaborations, leading to a fairer load distribution, or in establishing new collaborations, leading to an even less fair distribution of loads and payoffs.
arXiv comment10 pages, 3 figures
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