Successful attack on permutation-parity-machine-based neural cryptography

Abstract

An algorithm is presented which implements a probabilistic attack on the key-exchange protocol based on permutation parity machines. Instead of imitating the synchronization of the communicating partners, the strategy consists of a Monte Carlo method to sample the space of possible weights during inner rounds and an analytic approach to convey the extracted information from one outer round to the next one. The results show that the protocol under attack fails to synchronize faster than an eavesdropper using this algorithm.

4 pages, 2 figures; abstract changed, note about chaos cryptography added, typos corrected

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