Coexistence of cooperators and defectors in well mixed populations mediated by limiting resources

Abstract

Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to allow for the stable coexistence between unconditional cooperators and defectors in well-mixed populations. This is a consequence of a self-organizing process that turns the interaction payoff matrix into evolutionary neutral, and represents a resource-based control mechanism preventing the spread of defectors. To our knowledge, this is the first example of coexistence in well-mixed populations with a game structure different from a snowdrift game.

9 pages, 7 figures

References in corpus (5)

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• Evolutionary game theory in growing populations
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• Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors
• Analytical models for well-mixed populations of cooperators and defectors under limiting resources
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• Topology dependent payoffs can lead to escape from prisoner's dilemma
• Behavior in a Shared Resource Game with Cooperative, Greedy, and Vigilante Players
• Oscillatory evolution of collective behavior in evolutionary games played with reinforcement learning
• A phenomenological analysis of eco-evolutionary coupling under dilution