Prisoner's Dilemma: non-trivial results for the lowest temptation level in the Darwinian and Pavlovian evolutionary strategies

Abstract

The lowest temptation level (T = 1) is considered a trivial case for the Prisoner's Dilemma. Here, we show that this statement is true only for a very particular case, where the players interact with only one player. Otherwise, if the players interact with more than one player, the system presents the same possible behaviors observed for $T>1$. In the steady state, the system can reach the cooperative, chaotic or defective phases, when adopting the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy and the cooperative or quasi-regular phases, adopting the Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy.

5 pages, 2 color figures, submitted to EPJB

References in corpus (1)

• Pavlovian Prisoner's Dilemma in one-dimensional cellular automata: analytical results, the quasi-regular phase, spatio-temporal patterns and parameter space exploration