Deterministic quantum-public-key encryption: forward search attack and randomization

Abstract

In the classical setting, public-key encryption requires randomness in order to be secure against a forward search attack, whereby an adversary compares the encryption of a guess of the secret message with that of the actual secret message. We show that this is also true in the information-theoretic setting -- where the public keys are quantum systems -- by defining and giving an example of a forward search attack for any deterministic quantum-public-key bit-encryption scheme. However, unlike in the classical setting, we show that any such deterministic scheme can be used as a black box to build a randomized bit-encryption scheme that is no longer susceptible to this attack.

5 pages, 1 figure

References in corpus (4)

• Quantum fingerprinting
• A Three-Stage Quantum Cryptography Protocol
• Experimentally realizable quantum comparison of coherent states and its applications
• Applications of single-qubit rotations in quantum public-key cryptography

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