Strategies of Voting in Stochastic Environment: Egoism and Collectivism

Abstract

Consideration was given to a model of social dynamics controlled by successive collective decisions based on the threshold majority procedures. The current system state is characterized by the vector of participants' capitals (utilities). At each step, the voters can either retain their status quo or accept the proposal which is a vector of the algebraic increments in the capitals of the participants. In this version of the model, the vector is generated stochastically. Comparative utility of two social attitudes--egoism and collectivism--was analyzed. It was established that, except for some special cases, the collectivists have advantages, which makes realizable the following scenario: on the conditions of protecting the corporate interests, a group is created which is joined then by the egoists attracted by its achievements. At that, group egoism approaches altruism. Additionally, one of the considered variants of collectivism handicaps manipulation of voting by the organizers.

arXiv comment18 pages, 7 figures, translated from Russian by M.A. Kasner

Cited by in corpus (7)

• The Optimal Majority Threshold as a Function of the Variation Coefficient of the Environment
• Analysis of Collectivism and Egoism Phenomena within the Context of Social Welfare
• Comparative Efficiency of Altruism and Egoism as Voting Strategies in Stochastic Environment
• On Optimal Group Claims at Voting in a Stochastic Environment
• Voting in a Stochastic Environment: The Case of Two Groups
• Modeling Responsible Elite
• The effectiveness of altruistic lobbying: A model study