The effect of the topology on the spatial ultimatum game

Abstract

In this work we present an analysis of a spatially non homogeneous ultimatum game. By considering different underlying topologies as substrates on top of which the game takes place we obtain nontrivial behaviors for the evolution of the strategies of the players. We analyze separately the effect of the size of the neighborhood and the spatial structure. Whereas this last effect is the most significant one, we show that even for disordered networks and provided the neighborhood of each site is small, the results can be significantly different from those obtained in the case of fully connected networks.

6 pages, 5 figures

References in corpus (3)

• Evolutionary games on graphs
• Clique percolation in random networks
• Promotion of cooperation induced by nonlinear attractive effect in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game

Cited by in corpus (5)

• Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks
• Making new connections towards cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks
• Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas
• The topological issues of cooperation