Key rate available from mismatched mesurements in the BB84 protocol and the uncertainty principle
arXiv:0711.1731 · doi:10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2870
Abstract
We consider the mismatched measurements in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measuring bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probability. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.
5 pages, no figure, ieice.cls. Title was changed from version 1. To appear in IEICE Trans. Fundamentals (http://ietfec.oxfordjournals.org/), vol. E91-A, no. 10, Oct. 2008
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