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From the 1 of 4.5k papers with an AI index.

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20022025
most citedQuantum ESPRESSO: a modular and open-source software project for quantum simulations of materials

29.3k citations

Showing 2010 · physics.soc-phShow all

10 papers · 2 filters

physics.soc-ph201012 cited

An Agent-Based Approach to Self-Organized Production

Thomas Seidel, Jeanette Hartwig, Richard L. Sanders +1

The chapter describes the modeling of a material handling system with the production of individual units in a scheduled order. The units represent the agents in the model and are t…

physics.soc-ph201041 cited

BioLogistics and the Struggle for Efficiency: Concepts and Perspectives

Dirk Helbing, Andreas Deutsch, Stefan Diez +8

The growth of world population, limitation of resources, economic problems and environmental issues force engineers to develop increasingly efficient solutions for logistic systems…

physics.soc-ph201057 cited

The Future of Social Experimenting

Dirk Helbing, Wenjian Yu

Recent lab experiments by Traulsen et al. for the spatial prisoner's dilemma suggest that exploratory behavior of human subjects prevents cooperation through neighborhood interacti…

physics.soc-ph201065 cited

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Dirk Helbing, Anders Johansson

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is li…

physics.soc-ph201058 cited

Tactical Voting in Plurality Elections

Nuno A. M. Araújo, José S. Andrade, Hans J. Herrmann

How often will elections end in landslides? What is the probability for a head-to-head race? Analyzing ballot results from several large countries rather anomalous and yet unexplai…

physics.soc-ph2010420 cited

Punish, but not too hard: How costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game

Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc +1

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators…