output
20172026
most citedFactuality Challenges in the Era of Large Language Models

163 citations

researchers with a paper here

Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.

collaborating institutions
Showing 2026Show all

7 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2026

dfence: Fine-Grained Speculation Barriers for Efficient and Effective Hardware-Software Protection in the Spectre Era (Extended Version)

Davide Davoli, Marton Bognar, Lesly-Ann Daniel +3

Speculative execution attacks such as Spectre-PHT and Spectre-STL remain a critical security concern in modern processors. While software-based mitigations like Speculative Load Ha…

cs.HC2026★ 1 cited

Characterizing Scam-Driven Human Trafficking Across Chinese Borders and Online Community Responses on RedNote

Jiamin Zheng, Yue Deng, Jessica Chen +3

A new form of human trafficking has emerged across Chinese borders, where individuals are lured to Southeast Asia with fraudulent job offers and then coerced into operating online…

cs.CR2026

Hardware Trojans from Invisible Inversions: On the Trojanizability of Standard Cell Libraries

Kolja Dorschel, René Walendy, Lukas Plätz +3

At S&P 2023, Puschner et al. made a valuable dataset for hardware Trojan detection research publicly available. It contains a complete set of Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) ima…

cs.CR2026

SAMSEM -- A Generic and Scalable Approach for IC Metal Line Segmentation

Christian Gehrmann, Jonas Ricker, Simon Damm +5

In light of globalized hardware supply chains, the assurance of hardware components has gained significant interest, particularly in cryptographic applications and high-stakes scen…

cs.CY2026★ 1 cited

What is Safety? Corporate Discourse, Power, and the Politics of Generative AI Safety

Ankolika De, Gabriel Lima, Yixin Zou

This work examines how leading generative artificial intelligence companies construct and communicate the concept of "safety" through public-facing documents. Drawing on critical d…

cs.CR2026

Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking

Jonathan Baumann, Yonghyun Kim, Yan Farba +2

This paper introduces Triosecuris, a formally verified defense against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT that combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inse…

cs.HC2026★ 2 cited

From Harm to Healing: Understanding Individual Resilience after Cybercrimes

Xiaowei Chen, Mindy Tran, Yue Deng +2

How do individuals recover from cybercrimes? Victims experience various types of harm after cybercrimes, including monetary loss, data breaches, negative emotions, and even psychol…