91 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Institut de Mathématiques de Jussieu-Paris Rive GaucheFR8 papers
- Centre National de la Recherche ScientifiqueFR7 papers
- Pôle Léonard de VinciFR6 papers
- Vinci (France)FR5 papers
- Université Paris CitéFR3 papers
- AlbaNovaSE1 paper
- Astrophysique, Instrumentation et ModélisationFR1 paper
- Astrophysique Relativiste, Théories, Expériences, Métrologie, Instrumentation, SignauxFR1 paper
- California Institute of TechnologyUS1 paper
- CEA Paris-SaclayFR1 paper
- Centre Hospitalier d'ArrasFR1 paper
- City University of SeattleUS1 paper
6 papers · 1 filter
Block withholding resilience
Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Perez-Marco
It has been known for some time that the Nakamoto consensus as implemented in the Bitcoin protocol is not totally aligned with the individual interests of the participants. More pr…
On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend
Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Pérez-Marco
Nakamoto double spend strategy, described in Bitcoin foundational article, leads to total ruin with positive probability and does not make sense from the profitability point of vie…
Bitcoin Selfish Mining and Dyck Words
Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Pérez-Marco
We give a straightforward proof for the formula giving the long-term apparent hashrate of the Selfish Mining strategy in Bitcoin using only elementary probabilities and combinatori…
On Profitability of Trailing Mining
Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Pérez-Marco
We compute the revenue ratio of the Trail Stubborn mining strategy in the Bitcoin network and compare its profitability to other block-withholding strategies. We use for this marti…
On profitability of stubborn mining
Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Pérez-Marco
We compute and compare profitabilities of stubborn mining strategies that are variations of selfish mining. These are deviant mining strategies violating Bitcoin's network protocol…
Satoshi Risk Tables
Cyril Grunspan, Ricardo Pérez-Marco
We present Bitcoin Security Tables computing the probability of success p(z,q,t) of a double spend attack by an attacker controlling a share q of the hashrate after z confirmations…