332 citations
- Tel Aviv UniversityIL25 papers
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- Technion – Israel Institute of TechnologyIL13 papers
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- Weizmann Institute of ScienceIL3 papers
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- Aix-Marseille UniversitéFR1 paper
7 papers · 1 filter
Learning in Budgeted Auctions with Spacing Objectives
Giannis Fikioris, Robert Kleinberg, Yoav Kolumbus +3
In many repeated auction settings, participants care not only about how frequently they win but also how their winnings are distributed over time. This problem arises in various pr…
Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization
Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim +1
Two prominent objectives in social choice are utilitarian - maximizing the sum of agents' utilities, and leximin - maximizing the smallest agent's utility, then the second-smallest…
Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration
Lee Cohen, Yishay Mansour
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only in…
Non-Price Equilibria in Markets of Discrete Goods
Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour +1
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of…
Matching with Couples Revisited
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a gen…
Approximation Schemes for Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha +2
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing {\em sequential posted-pricing mechanisms (SPM)} in -unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller ha…