From the 1 of 6 papers with an AI index.
1 citations
- Ruhr University BochumDE3 papers
- École Normale Supérieure - PSLFR1 paper
- EURECOMFR1 paper
- Helmholtz Center for Information SecurityDE1 paper
- Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numériqueFR1 paper
- KU LeuvenBE1 paper
- Portland State UniversityUS1 paper
- Technische Universität BraunschweigDE1 paper
- UCLouvainBE1 paper
- University of California, Los AngelesUS1 paper
- University of PaduaIT1 paper
6 papers
dfence: Fine-Grained Speculation Barriers for Efficient and Effective Hardware-Software Protection in the Spectre Era (Extended Version)
Davide Davoli, Marton Bognar, Lesly-Ann Daniel +3
Speculative execution attacks such as Spectre-PHT and Spectre-STL remain a critical security concern in modern processors. While software-based mitigations like Speculative Load Ha…
Decompiling for Constant-Time Analysis
Santiago Arranz-Olmos, Gilles Barthe, Lionel Blatter +3
The paper investigates the reliability of the Decompile‑then‑Analyze (DtA) approach for verifying constant‑time (CT) security of compiled code, showing that existing decompilers ca…
Hardware Trojans from Invisible Inversions: On the Trojanizability of Standard Cell Libraries
Kolja Dorschel, René Walendy, Lukas Plätz +3
At S&P 2023, Puschner et al. made a valuable dataset for hardware Trojan detection research publicly available. It contains a complete set of Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) ima…
Evaluating LLM-Based Regression Test Generation
Jing Liu, Seongmin Lee, Eleonora Losiouk +1
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown tremendous promise in automated software engineering. In this paper, we investigate LLMs for just-in-time regression test generation for pro…
An Empirical Study of Fuzz Harness Degradation
Philipp Görz, Joschua Schilling, Nicolai Bissantz +1
The purpose of continuous fuzzing platforms is to enable fuzzing for software projects via fuzz harnesses -- but as the projects continue to evolve, are these harnesses updated in…
Triosecuris: Formally Verified Protection Against Speculative Control-Flow Hijacking
Jonathan Baumann, Yonghyun Kim, Yan Farba +2
This paper introduces Triosecuris, a formally verified defense against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT that combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inse…