papers

Publications (21)

cs.DS2025

A Faster Randomized Algorithm for Vertex Cover: An Automated Approach

Katie Clinch, Serge Gaspers, Tao Zixu He +2

This work introduces two techniques for the design and analysis of branching algorithms, illustrated through the case study of the Vertex Cover problem. First, we present a method…

cs.GT2014

Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting

Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson +3

We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional appro…

cs.DS2017

A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents

Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to find an envy-free allocation based on queries from agents. The problem has received attention in compu…

cs.GT2026

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Mixed Goods and Chores

Haris Aziz, Xiaolin Bu, Xinhang Lu +4

We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing indivisible items among agents with additive utilities. In our model, an item can be a good yielding non-negative utilities to s…

cs.GT2026

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations

Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

One of the central questions in discrete fair division is whether fairness and efficiency can be achieved simultaneously. For indivisible goods, a canonical relaxation of envy-free…

cs.GT2014

Structure and complexity of ex post efficient random assignments

Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie, Lirong Xia +1

In the random assignment problem, objects are randomly assigned to agents keeping in view the agents' preferences over objects. A random assignment specifies the probability of an…

cs.CC2026

Refuting the Direct Sum Conjecture for Total Functions in Deterministic Communication Complexity

Simon Mackenzie, Abdallah Saffidine

In communication complexity the input of a function is distributed between two players Alice and Bob. If Alice knows only and Bob only ,…

cs.GT2025

Fair Division with Indivisible Goods, Chores, and Cake

Haris Aziz, Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie +1

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisi…

cs.GT2026

Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Goods and Chores: One Dollar Each Suffices

Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities. In our setting, each indivisible item may be a good, yielding non-negative utility to s…

cs.GT2015

Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule

Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie +3

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. Howe…

cs.DS2026

Faster Exponential-Time Approximate Counting via Bounded Self-Reductions

Katie Clinch, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie +1

We give faster exponential-time randomised approximation algorithms for counting problems where polynomial-time approximation is unavailable and exact exponential-time counting rem…

cs.DS2015

On the Number of Minimal Separators in Graphs

Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie

We consider the largest number of minimal separators a graph on n vertices can have at most. We give a new proof that this number is in . We prove that t…

cs.CC2026

NP-Completeness of Deterministic Communication Complexity via Relaxed Interlacing

Serge Gaspers, Tao Zixu He, Simon Mackenzie

We prove that computing the deterministic communication complexity of a Boolean function, given its truth table, is \textsf{NP}-complete in the standard protocol-tree-depth model,…

cs.GT2015

Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences

Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie +1

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stoc…

cs.GT2026

Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive Valuations

Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental question in fair division. In this paper, we construct a three-agent, eight-good instance with monotone subadditive valuations suc…

cs.GT2015

Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms

Haris Aziz, Jiashu Chen, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +2

We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different…

cs.GT2018

The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy

Paul Gölz, Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie +1

Liquid democracy is the principle of making collective decisions by letting agents transitively delegate their votes. Despite its significant appeal, it has become apparent that a…

cs.RO2017

The Provable Virtue of Laziness in Motion Planning

Nika Haghtalab, Simon Mackenzie, Ariel D. Procaccia +2

The Lazy Shortest Path (LazySP) class consists of motion-planning algorithms that only evaluate edges along shortest paths between the source and target. These algorithms were desi…

cs.DS2016

A Discrete and Bounded Envy-free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents

Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie

We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted…

cs.GT2015

Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule

Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie +3

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties,…

cs.GT2016

Complexity of Manipulating Sequential Allocation

Haris Aziz, Sylvain Bouveret, Jerome Lang +1

Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given pre-specified turns and each agents gets the most preferred item that is still available. It has lo…