Publications (18)
Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News
Tuval Danenberg, Drew Fudenberg
We study the impact of endogenous attention in a dynamic social media model. Each period, a user observes a random story and decides whether to share it. Users like sharing true an…
A Reputation for Honesty
Drew Fudenberg, Ying Gao, Harry Pei
We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an…
Model Restrictiveness in Functional and Structural Settings
Drew Fudenberg, Wayne Yuan Gao, Zhiheng You
We extend the restrictiveness measure of Fudenberg, Gao & Liang (2026) to functional and structural econometric settings using Gaussian process priors. We find that models evaluate…
Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure
Yifan Dai, Drew Fudenberg, Harry Pei
A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private inf…
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player rol…
Simple Records Support Robust Indirect Reciprocity
Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Wolitzky
Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: image scoring models fai…